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Abstract We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically-
and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in
situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while
controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which
strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of co-
operation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame
effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated
games is strategic.
Keywords Repeated games · Cooperation · Reputation building · Strong reciprocity
JEL Classification C92 · D01 · D70
1 Introduction
In order to design policies and institutions that promote cooperation in social dilem-
mas, it is important to understand and measure the pervasiveness of the various mo-
tivations behind cooperation. Broadly speaking, in social dilemma games with re-
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peated interaction, cooperation can be the result of strategic and non-strategic motiva-
tions. Strategic cooperation is cooperation motivated solely by the prospect of future
interaction and supported by the future behavior of others. By contrast, non-strategic
cooperation refers to cooperation that is not forward looking. It refers to individu-
als motivated to cooperate (at least under certain circumstances) in situations where
there is no future interaction. Whereas both strategic and non-strategic cooperation
are supported by experimental evidence (see Sobel 2005, for a review of the litera-
ture), it is not known which share of cooperation can be attributed to each of these
motivations.1 To a large extent, this is because in repeated games it is not sufficient
to observe individual choices to tell whether cooperation is strategic or not. Does an
individual cooperate solely because there is future interaction and stops cooperating
when this possibility disappears? Or is he a conditional cooperator who expects oth-
ers to cooperate when there is future interaction and stop cooperating when there is
no future interaction?2 In this paper, we propose a novel experimental method that
solves this identification problem, and we use it to measure the amount of coopera-
tion in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game that can be attributed to strategic and to
non-strategic motivations.
To distinguish strategic from non-strategic motivations for cooperation, we run
an experiment where subjects play an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game
where they know whether the period they are currently playing is the last period of
the game or not. However, since we are interested in motivations for cooperation
that come up in finitely-repeated games, we use parameters such that cooperation in
our game cannot be rationalized as being part of an equilibrium of the indefinitely-
repeated game assuming common knowledge of rationality and own-payoff maxi-
mization. We use the strategy method developed by Selten (1967) to allow a first type
of players, henceforth first movers, to condition their decision on whether the period
they are currently playing is the last period of the game or is not the last period of the
game. Moreover, there is a second type of players, henceforth second movers, who
are allowed to condition their decision on: (i) whether the period they are playing is
or is not the last period of the game, and (ii) whether the first mover cooperates or
defects. We validate our use of the strategy method by comparing behavior in this
setting to behavior in control treatments that do not use the strategy method.
1On the one hand, cooperation in experiments without future interaction suggests there is scope for non-
strategic cooperation because, in these settings, cooperation cannot be strategic (and rational) by definition.
On the other hand, the existence of strategic cooperation is suggested by differences in cooperation be-
tween random-matching and fixed-matching treatments, which have been found in bribery games (Abbink
2004), principal-agent games (Cochard and Willinger 2005), trust games (Huck et al. 2006), conflict games
(Lacomba et al. 2010), prisoner’s dilemma games (Duffy and Ochs 2009), gift-exchange games (Gächter
and Falk 2002), and public good games (Croson 1996; Keser and van Winden 2000). In contrast, Andreoni
(1988) finds more cooperation under random matching (for an explanation of these mixed results see
Andreoni and Croson 2008). Moreover, studies with indefinitely-repeated games (see e.g., Dal Bó 2005;
Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009; Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011) convincingly show that the subjects’ behavior is
consistent with theories that predict strategic cooperation by rational own-payoff maximizing players.
2The same confounding effect is also found when comparing fixed-matching and random-matching ex-
periments (where a one-shot game is played repeatedly). The lower rate of cooperation that is typically
observed under random matching compared to fixed matching can be caused by strategically-motivated
individuals who do not have a reason to cooperate under random matching, or by conditional cooperators
who believe others will cooperate less under random matching.
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The novelty of this experimental method is that it allows us to simultaneously
observe choices in the continuation game and in the end game within subjects, and
crucially, observe counterfactual behavior (of second movers) in the last period. That
is, we know whether second movers cooperate or defect in the last period of the
game when it is certain that the first mover will cooperate. Strictly speaking, second
movers who are willing to cooperate in the last period must be motivated by non-
strategic reasons.3 In contrast, second movers who always defect in the last period,
but who are willing to cooperate in non-last periods, are clearly cooperating solely
for strategic reasons. We can make this inference for second movers as they face no
uncertainty with respect to the first mover’s behavior.4
We find that most of the cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game is
strategically motivated. We also find that the individuals’ motivation to cooperate is
relatively stable over time. In other words, individuals consistently choose either a
strategically-motivated strategy or a non-strategically-motivated strategy across pe-
riods. Moreover, eliciting strategies does not produce behavior that is different from
behavior in the control treatments where strategies were not elicited.
The method proposed in this paper can also be used to disentangle the so-called
endgame effect: a sharp decline in cooperation in the last periods of a repeated game
(see Selten and Stoecker 1986; Selten et al. 1997; Keser and van Winden 2000).
If cooperation is entirely strategic, it drops in the last periods because strategically-
motivated individuals no longer have an incentive to cooperate. However, cooperation
can also drop when it is non-strategic if individuals believe others will stop cooper-
ating in the last periods and this induces them to stop cooperating themselves.5 In
existing experiments, one cannot tell how much of the drop in cooperation is due to
the presence of strategic cooperation and how much is due to expectations of strategic
cooperation, whereas in our experiment one can.
Our paper can be seen as building on the work of Fischbacher et al. (2001), who
introduce a method to identify different types of motivations for cooperation in a one-
shot game, which precludes strategic behavior by nature.6 By eliciting strategies in
a repeated setting, we can identify different types of both non-strategic and strategic
motivations for cooperation.
A number of studies estimate repeated-game strategies on the basis of experimen-
tal data (e.g. Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2004, 2006; Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009;
3We do not suggest that individuals who cooperate in the last period are failing to take into account the
(future) behavior of others. Instead, we suggest that players who exhibit this behavior are not exclusively
motivated to cooperate by strategic considerations.
4We cannot fully identify the motivations for cooperation of first movers because their expectation of the
behavior of others does affect their choice. In fact, as we argue in the body of the paper, the behavior of
first movers is likely to be driven exclusively by their expectations, which allows us to measure the impact
that expectations have on cooperation.
5The experiments of Croson (2000) and Gächter and Renner (2006), for example, show that the observed
pattern of beliefs closely resembles the observed pattern of actions. Kreps et al. (1982) propose a model
that rationalizes this pattern by assuming incomplete information concerning preferences for cooperation.
6Duffy and Ochs (2009) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) use this method to show that the elicited
strategies predict subsequent behavior in a repeated version of the game where subjects are randomly
rematched in every period.
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Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011; Fudenberg et al. 2011). Overall, individuals use strate-
gies that produce an endgame effect in finitely-repeated games and punishment of
free riders that resemble (lenient) grim-trigger or tit-for-tat strategies in indefinitely-
repeated games.7 The strategies observed in these studies can be the result of both
strategic and non-strategic cooperators, and therefore, these papers cannot differenti-
ate between the two motivations.
Muller et al. (2008), Bruttel and Kamecke (2011), Dreber et al. (2011), and Cabral
et al. (2011) are the closest related studies. Muller et al. (2008) report an experiment
where subjects play a two-period linear public good game in which they can condi-
tion their contribution in the second period on the total contribution of others in the
first period. The result is that strategic behavior has a more pronounced effect than
learning in explaining the endgame effect. Bruttel and Kamecke (2011) have partici-
pants play a prisoner’s dilemma game three times in a row and then, for the remaining
periods of the repeated game, submit conditional choices depending on the four po-
tential outcomes in the previous period. They find that such short-memory strategies
account for a large share of actual decisions in the indefinitely-repeated game. Our
method adds another component, which is the identification of strategically- and non-
strategically-motivated cooperation. In particular, in Muller et al. (2008) and Bruttel
and Kamecke (2011), choices within each period are simultaneous and therefore af-
fected by expectations. For example, even when contributions in the previous period
are high, subjects who are conditional cooperators would still defect in the current
period if they believe others will defect in the current period (after cooperating strate-
gically in the previous period). Dreber et al. (2011) take a different approach and
identify strategic from non-strategic cooperation by studying the correlation between
cooperative strategies in indefinitely-repeated games and behavior in a one-shot dic-
tator game. They find no correlation between the two. In our paper, we identify the
motivation for cooperation within the same game, and therefore, our method is not
affected by behavioral changes induced by differences in the games played. Finally,
Cabral et al. (2011) also disentangle strategic and non-strategic motivations by in-
forming subjects if the period they are playing is the last period of an indefinitely-
repeated game. It differs from our study in that it does not use the strategy method,
and focuses on motivations to cooperate in infinitely repeated games where coopera-
tion can be supported in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe the game and method-
ology used in the experiments. In Sect. 3 we describe the experimental design and
procedures. We present the results in Sect. 4 and conclude in Sect. 5.
2 Description of the game and methodology
The game played in the experiment is the strategic equivalent of an indefinitely-
repeated sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. In each period, with probability (1−δ)
7Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004) find that the cooperation rate of inexperienced subjects does not differ
between finitely and indefinitely-repeated games (as do Normann and Wallace 2006), but does differ with
experienced subjects (see also Dal Bó 2005).
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the game ends after the period is played and with probability δ the game continues.
In the stage game, each of the two players can either cooperate or defect. If both
players cooperate they each get πC , if both defect they each get πD , and if one de-
fects and the other cooperates the defector gets the temptation payoff πT and the
cooperator gets the sucker payoff πS . Payoffs are such that defecting is the dominant
strategy (πT > πC > πD > πS ), and mutual cooperation is the efficient outcome
(2πC > πT + πS ).
The main feature of our experimental method is that, in each period, players can
condition their action on whether they are currently playing the final period of the
game, to which we refer to as the last period, or whether they are not playing the
last period of the game, to which we refer to as continuation periods. In addition,
one of the two players is designated to be the first mover and the other to be the
second mover. The second mover can condition her action on whether the first mover
cooperates or defects. In other words, the first mover submits an action for two cases:
(i) the game continues and (ii) the game ends; and the second mover submits an
action for four cases: (i) the first mover cooperates and the game continues, (ii) the
first mover defects and the game continues, (iii) the first mover cooperates and the
game ends, and (iv) the first mover defects and the game ends. After both players
make a decision, they learn whether they were playing a continuation period or the
last period of the game, and they are informed about the corresponding action of the
other player. Note that players are informed only of the realized action of the other
player and not of the other player’s contingent choices.
As previously mentioned, our method allows us to observe the stage-game strate-
gies used by second movers.8 There are two strategies that are of special interest. The
first one consists of reciprocating the first mover’s choice irrespective of whether it
is a continuation period or the last period. We refer to this strategy as strong reci-
procity, that is, reciprocity irrespective of potential future interaction (Gintis 2000;
Fehr et al. 2002). The second one corresponds to reciprocating only if a continuation
period is being played and defecting if the last period is being played. We refer to this
strategy as reputation building since it is a clear example of strategically-motivated
cooperation. These and other important strategies are described in Table 1. For exam-
ple, it is also informative to know the prevalence of second movers who choose the
strategies unconditional defection and unconditional cooperation.
As is well known, cooperation in indefinitely-repeated games can be achieved by
rational own-payoff maximizing individuals with the use of trigger strategies (Fried-
man 1971). In fact, for a sufficiently high δ, any payoff between the cooperative and
the defection payoff can be supported by some equilibrium strategy (Rubinstein 1979;
Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). In our game, mutual cooperation by rational own-
payoff maximizers is supported in continuation periods if δ is larger than the thresh-
old δ∗ = (πT −πC)/(πT −πD).9 This follows from the fact that both players always
8To facilitate reading, we will often refer to stage-game strategies simply as strategies. We do not elicit the
actual strategies for the whole game as doing so could require an infinite number of questions.
9We are assuming no time discounting in the experiment, which we think is reasonable since the time
interval between periods is very short and subjects are not paid until the end.
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Table 1 Strategies of second movers
Continuation period Last period
Strategy
First mover First mover First mover First mover
Cooperates Defects Cooperates Defects
Unconditional defection Defect Defect Defect Defect
Unconditional cooperation Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate
Reputation building Cooperate Defect Defect Defect
Strong reciprocity Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect
defect when they play the last period of the game, which makes the game in continua-
tion periods equivalent to an indefinitely-repeated game.10 Therefore, mutual cooper-
ation can be sustained in continuation periods by a trigger strategy if δ ≥ δ∗, in which
case the second mover can get a higher payoff by cooperating than by defecting.11
The pervasiveness of strategic versus non-strategic cooperation and the study of
endgame effects has been done mostly in finitely-repeated games (e.g., see the ref-
erences in footnote 1). To reproduce the motivations for cooperation present in these
studies, we use parameter values such that mutual cooperation is not part of an equi-
librium under common knowledge that all players are rational own-payoff maximiz-
ers.12 We do so by setting the probability of continuation and the payoffs of the stage
game such that δ < δ∗ in all our treatments.13 Under this condition, individuals can be
motivated to cooperate by two distinct reasons. First, individuals might cooperate for
non-strategic reasons (e.g., due to other-regarding preferences). Second, individuals
might cooperate strategically because they believe there are people in the popula-
tion who reciprocate cooperation for non-strategic reasons (see Kreps et al. 1982).
Specifically, first (second) movers might rationally cooperate in not-last periods (i.e.,
reputation-build) if they believe there are sufficiently many second (first) movers who
are willing to cooperate in the last period as long as they have not experienced de-
fection in not-last periods, or put differently, if the probability of being paired with a
strong reciprocator is sufficiently high.14
10A general worry with playing indefinitely-repeated games is that subjects know the experiment cannot
last for an extremely long time. Thus, they might discount future interactions at a rate that is lower than δ.
However, for the purpose of our experiment, this can at most induce a small decrease in the frequency of
strategically motivated cooperation (individuals who are cooperating for non-strategic reasons and those
who are already defecting are not affected by more discounting).
11Given that the second mover has no reason to cooperate if the first mover defects, the first mover does
not have an incentive to deviate from an equilibrium with mutual cooperation.
12One can expect some degree of unilateral cooperation if subjects play a correlated equilibrium and δ ≥
(πD − πS)/(πT − πD) (see Stahl 1991). However, these equilibria require a high degree of coordination
that is hard to achieve. We report whether there is evidence for these type of strategies in footnote 20.
13As previously mentioned, we choose a low continuation probability so that cooperation by solely rational
own-payoff maximizers is not an equilibrium. However, it would also be interesting to have a longer
time horizon where δ ≥ δ∗ in order to study equilibrium selection and conditional cooperation in these
conditions.
14Since the Kreps et al. (1982) model utilizes mixed strategies—which are hard to observe by eliciting
only stage-game strategies (see the discussion in Palacios-Huerta and Volij 2008)—we are unable to test
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3 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment was conducted in 2007 in CentERlab at Tilburg University. It was
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and lasted about 45 minutes. Subjects
were recruited through online recruitment systems. In total, 180 subjects participated
and each subject played only once. After their arrival, subjects drew a card to be ran-
domly assigned to a seat in the laboratory, and consequently to a role and a treatment.
Once everyone was seated, subjects were given the instructions for the experiment.
The instructions are written with neutral language. Thereafter, roles were revealed
and subjects had to answer control questions to corroborate their understanding of
the game. Next, they played the game until the random draw indicated that it ended.
Roles and pairs were kept constant throughout the experiment so it is plausible to
assume that there is no correlation across the decisions of the different pairs.15 Once
the game finished, subjects answered a debriefing questionnaire after which they were
paid in cash and dismissed. See the online supplementary materials for an example
of the instructions.
The experiment consists of one treatment where we implemented the game de-
scribed in the previous section, which we refer to as Main, and two control treatments.
The purpose of Main is to identify the various strategies used by second movers, while
the purpose of the control treatments is to identify any behavioral changes induced
by the strategy method.
In principle, it is possible that the use of the strategy method induces a change
in behavior. In the experimental literature there is yet no consensus if this is indeed
the case. Various authors report no significant differences in, for example, sequential
dictator games (Cason and Mui 1998) and, closest to our study, chicken and prisoner’s
dilemma games (Brandts and Charness 2000). However, there are also studies that do
find differences in behavior. For instance, some authors have found less punishment
with the use of the strategy method than without it (Brosig et al. 2003; Falk et al.
2005). For a comprehensive survey of the effects of the strategy method see Brandts
and Charness (forthcoming).
We use two control treatments to test whether the method affects behavior in our
setting. In the first control treatment, Control I, subjects play the same game as in
Main except that they do not submit a decision for both last and not-last periods. In
Control I, subjects are told whether the game ends or continues before the start of
each period, and then they make their decision. Note that second movers still sub-
mit contingent choices depending on whether the first mover cooperates or not. By
comparing choices between Control I and Main, we can test whether behavior is af-
fected by conditioning decisions on whether it is the last period or not. In the second
control, Control II, we again implement the same game but this time without the use
of the strategy method (i.e., subjects play the game “normally”). Here, subjects are
whether the observed amount of reputation building is consistent with that model’s predictions. In addition,
the uncertain duration of the game used in this paper makes it unclear how to calculate the subjects’ optimal
behavior once cooperation starts to unravel. For experimental tests of the Kreps et al. (1982) model, see
Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Andreoni and Miller (1993).
15The multiple observations of a given pair will be treated as correlated throughout the data analysis in
Sect. 4.
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told whether the game ends or continues before the start of each period, and second
movers learn what the first mover did before they make their choice. By comparing
behavior between Control I and Control II, we can test whether the decisions of sec-
ond movers are affected by the possibility to condition their choice on the action of
the first mover.
In all three treatments, we chose a continuation probability of δ = 0.60 and the
payoffs of the stage game were selected so that δ∗ > δ. In particular, payoffs in the
prisoner’s dilemma were the following: πD = 15,πC = 22,πT = 33 and πS = 10.
Subjects played the repeated game once. Therefore, by not having more iterations of
the repeated game, we potentially identify a lower bound for strategic cooperation.
For example, Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) show that in indefinitely-repeated games
where cooperation is part of an equilibrium, cooperation increases as subjects gain
experience, which suggests that subjects are learning to strategically cooperate. We
used a computer to randomly determine when the game ends, and in order to make the
three treatments easily comparable, the same random sequences generated for pairs
in Main were used for pairs in the control treatments. The average number of periods
played equaled 2.73, and average earnings were €9.38.
4 Results
In this section we present the experimental results. Since pairs of subjects played a
different number of periods, when we give descriptive statistics or perform hypothesis
tests that are based on data aggregated across periods, we adjust the statistic/test by
the inverse number of periods played. This way, each pair receives an equal weight.
Importantly, none of the qualitative results change if we concentrate on data from the
first period, which was played only once by all pairs.
We proceed as follows. In Sect. 4.1 we provide summary statistics of the realized
cooperation rates in the three treatments and test whether there are differences be-
tween Main and the two control treatments. In Sect. 4.2, we provide an overview of
the subjects’ strategies in Main in order to identify their motivations to cooperate.
In Sect. 4.3, we analyze the stability over time of the subjects’ strategies. Lastly, in
Sect. 4.4, we turn to the causes of the endgame effect.
4.1 Cooperation rates
Figure 1 gives an overview of the distribution of realized outcomes in all periods in
the three treatments. The mutual cooperation rates lie between 16% and 19% and
outcomes are clearly similar across the three treatments. This is corroborated if we
run a multinomial probit regression with the four outcomes as the dependent variable,
treatment dummies as independent variables, and using White’s heteroskedasticity
consistent estimator to cluster on pairs of subjects. We find that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that all outcomes occur with the same frequency in all treatments (p =
0.690). We also do not observe statistically significant differences across treatments
if we use probit regressions to compare separately the frequency of each outcome
(p > 0.147). Hence, we can safely conclude that our proposed method of eliciting
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Fig. 1 Realized outcomes. Note: The pie charts show the frequency of each of the four possible outcomes
in Main, Control I, and Control II. To give each pair of subjects the same weight, frequencies are weighted
by the inverse of the number of periods played
Table 2 Cooperation rates
All periods Cont. periods Last periods
M C-I C-II M C-I C-II M C-I C-II
Both players 33% 32% 29% 48% 39% 42% 15% 25% 20%
First movers 41% 36% 36% 56% 47% 48% 19% 27% 27%
Second movers 25% 28% 22% 39% 32% 36% 11% 23% 13%
Obs. 30 30 30 30 22 22 30 30 30
Second movers if the first mover:
Cooperates 37% 35% 34% 48% 52% 54% 21% 27% 13%
Obs. 30 30 18 30 22 13 30 30 8
Defects 8% 13% 10% 12% 7% 8% 6% 17% 14%
Obs. 30 30 25 30 22 13 30 30 22
Note: Cooperation rates and the number of independent observations in Main (M), Control I (C-I), and
Control II (C-II). Cooperation rates of first movers are based on the observed behavior in C-I and C-II and
on stage-game strategies in M. Cooperation rates of second movers are based on the observed behavior in
C-II and on stage-game strategies in C-I and M. To give each pair of subjects the same weight, frequencies
are weighted by the inverse of the number of periods played
choices within subjects—that is depending on whether the period of play is the last
one or not—does not translate into outcomes different from “hot” decision-making.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the cooperation rates of both players in all
periods and depending on whether they are playing a continuation period or the last
period. The cooperation rates of second movers depending on the choice of the first
mover are also included. The table shows that cooperation rates are largely similar
in the three treatments. In fact, for none of the cooperation rates in Table 2 do we
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find significant differences across the three treatments (Kruskal-Wallis tests based on
independent observations, p > 0.515).16
The table further shows that first movers cooperate more often than second movers
(as reported by Clark and Sefton 2001). Average cooperation rates of first movers
are 36–41% and those of second movers are 22–28%. This difference is driven by
behavior in continuation periods. In the last periods the difference largely disappears.
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (WSR tests) confirm that the difference between first
and second movers in continuation periods is significant in Main (p = 0.004) and
Control I (p = 0.009), and is weakly significant in Control II (p = 0.072)
Also consistent with existent literature, is that cooperation is mostly conditional
(see e.g. Keser and van Winden 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001). In particular, coop-
eration by second movers is strongly conditioned on the action of the first mover.
Average cooperation rates by second movers given that the first mover cooperates are
34–37% and those given that the first mover defects are 13% or lower. Again, the
effect is mostly due to continuation periods where the difference in cooperation rates
is statistically significant in Main (WSR test, p = 0.001) and Control I (WSR test,
p = 0.002).17
Finally, we can see in Table 2 that endgame effects are prevalent: cooperation rates
in continuation periods are higher than those in the last period. The differences are at
least weakly significant (WSR tests, p < 0.001 in Main, p = 0.048 in Control I, and
p = 0.089 in Control II).
To summarize, we recover results that are common in the cooperation literature,
and we find that the use of the strategy method to separate continuation-game from
endgame behavior within subjects does not induce different behavior compared to
“hot” decision-making.18 Hence, our proposed method is well-suited to disentangle
the different motivations that underly the observed cooperation.
4.2 Strategies
In this subsection we focus on the strategies observed in Main. We begin with the
first movers’ strategies. Always defecting accounts for 39% of the first movers’ stage-
game strategies. For first movers who cooperate, we find that most do so as long as
there is future interaction. In other words, their stage-game strategy consists of coop-
erating in continuation periods and defecting in the last period: first movers submit
this strategy 42% of the time.19 This finding is interesting as first movers have an
incentive to defect in the last period only if they anticipate that a large fraction of
second movers cooperate strategically.
16If we use Mann-Whitney U tests to do pairwise comparisons between the three treatments, we do not
find a statistically significant difference for any of the cooperation rates (p > 0.320).
17There are too few observations in Control II to do a within-subjects WSR test. However, a between-
subjects Mann-Whitney U test does result in a statistically significant difference (p = 0.006).
18In Appendix A.1 we compare Main to Control I to further show that using the strategy method to
condition on whether it is the last period or not, does not affect how subjects condition their choice on the
action of the first mover.
19Cooperating in continuation periods and also in the last period is the next most-common strategy. It
accounts for 14% of the first movers’ stage-game strategies.
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Fig. 2 Distribution of second movers’ strategies. Note: The bar chart shows the frequency of the strategies
used by second movers in Main, classified according to Table 1. To give each subject the same weight,
frequencies are weighted by the inverse of the number of periods played
Next, we identify the various motivations for cooperation by looking at the elicited
strategies of second movers. Figure 2 presents the distribution of second movers’
strategies in Main using the classification of Table 1. The complete distribution of
strategies is available in the Appendix (A.2). Overall, unconditional defection is the
most common strategy. It is chosen 44% of the time. However, this still leaves con-
siderable space for strategies that involve some cooperation.
The most frequent strategy that includes some cooperation is reputation build-
ing. It accounts for 33% of all strategies. Strong reciprocity is observed 6% of the
time. Unconditional cooperation is used less than 5% of the time and all other strate-
gies 13%.20
Next, we use the elicited strategies of second movers to describe how the differ-
ent motivations to cooperate account for two commonly reported behaviors in social
dilemma experiments: namely, positive levels of cooperation and the fact that coop-
eration is mostly conditional on the cooperation of others (i.e., subjects reciprocate).
Both of these behavioral patterns are present among second movers in our experiment
(see Table 2).
Reputation building is the most common reason for second-movers’ realized co-
operation. Of all the cooperative actions of second movers, 57% are due to reputa-
tion building. The other relatively important strategies are unconditional cooperation
and strong reciprocity, which respectively account for 17% and 14% of the second
movers’ cooperative actions.
20Two strategies account for around 70% of those in the “Other” category. The first is always defecting if
it is not the last period and reciprocating if it is. The second is always cooperating if it is not the last period
and reciprocating if it is. Note that we don’t find support for cooperation due to correlated equilibria (Stahl
1991)—perhaps due to the lack of a suitable coordination device. In these equilibria, we ought to observe
some second movers choosing in continuation periods to cooperate if the first mover defects and defect if
the first mover cooperates (and always defect in the last period). This strategy was chosen only once.
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We turn to the relative importance of the various strategies in explaining the preva-
lence of conditional cooperation among second movers. To do so, we use the strate-
gies to calculate the contingent choice second movers would have made if they could
condition their choice on the action of the first mover but not on whether it was the
last period or not. If this had been the case, we would observe that “always defect”
and “cooperate only if the first mover cooperates” (i.e., conditional cooperation) re-
spectively account for 61% and 31% of the second movers’ contingent choices. Ac-
cordingly, conditional cooperation accounts for 79% of the contingent choices that
involve some cooperation. Now, if we look at the strategies that are behind condi-
tional cooperation, we find that reputation building is the most common: it produces
64% of all conditional cooperation. In contrast, strong reciprocity produces 12% of
all conditional cooperation.
Finally, we evaluate whether it makes sense for second movers to use a reputation
building strategy. First, we calculate the expected payoff of using either a reputation
building or an unconditional defection strategy given the observed reaction of first
movers to the previous behavior of second movers. We find that the expected payoffs
of the two strategies are essentially equal: unconditional defection pays 48.1 points
and reputation building pays 48.0 points. Second, we show that under simplifying
assumptions, own-payoff maximizing second movers prefer reputation building over
unconditional defection if more than 2.8% of first movers are strong reciprocators
(i.e., they cooperate in period t as long as the second mover cooperated in period
t − 1, see the Appendix for the calculations). Guiding ourselves by the observed
percentage of strong reciprocity among second movers, we conclude that reputation
building is indeed a plausible strategy.
4.3 Dynamics
We start looking at how subjects change their strategies over time by first checking
whether the choices of second movers have an effect on the future behavior of first
movers. In particular, we see whether first movers reciprocate the behavior of second
movers in the previous period. On average, the cooperation rate of first movers is
49% if the second mover cooperated in the previous period and 25% if the second
mover defected. If we concentrate on continuation periods, we find that first movers
cooperate at a rate of 79% if the second mover cooperated and 28% if the second
mover defected. For last periods, cooperation rates are lower but the same qualitative
pattern remains: a cooperation rate of 31% if the second mover cooperated and 17% if
the second mover defected.21 This indicates that cooperation by second movers with
strategies such as reputation building does indeed elicit cooperation by first movers.22
21A probit regression with the decision of the first mover in continuation periods as the dependent variable
and the lagged action of the second mover as an independent variable results in a positive and significant
coefficient (β = 1.821, p < 0.001). For decisions corresponding to last periods, the same regression results
in a positive but not significant coefficient (β = 0.686, p = 0.165). If in additional regressions we control
for the previous action of the first mover, we find that these results are driven by first movers who cooper-
ated in the previous period (i.e., first movers who defected do not react to the action of the second mover).
Regressions were run using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent estimator to cluster on first movers.
22The fact that not all first movers cooperate after meeting a cooperating second mover fits within the
model of Kreps et al. (1982), which predicts that cooperation partially unravels in a finitely-repeated game.
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Fig. 3 Stability of strategies. Note: The figure shows how second movers change their strategy over time.
The size of the circles is proportional to the mean frequency of each strategy in period t . For each strategy,
curved arrows indicate the mean fraction of subjects in period t who choose that same strategy in period
t +1. For each strategy, straight arrows indicate the direction and mean fraction of subjects in period t who
switch to another strategy in period t + 1 (missing arrows imply no switching to that particular strategy).
To give each subject the same weight, sizes and percentages are weighted by the inverse of the number of
periods played
A full picture of the stability of strategies and the way in which second movers
switch between strategies is seen in Fig. 3. For simplicity we concentrate on the three
most common strategies: unconditional defection, reputation building, and strong
reciprocity. All other strategies are placed under “Other.” Moreover, given that we
are looking at changes over time, the data used includes only second movers who
played more than one period. The size of the circles is proportional to the frequency
in which each strategy is chosen in period t . For each strategy, the arrows indicate the
percentage of subjects that keep the same strategy in the next period, and if not, the
percentage of subjects that switch to each other strategy. Specifically, for each strat-
egy, curved arrows indicate the mean fraction of subjects in period t who choose that
same strategy in period t + 1. Similarly, for each strategy, straight arrows indicate the
direction and mean fraction of subjects in period t who switch to each other strategy
in period t + 1 (missing arrows imply no switching between to a particular strategy).
Hence, for example, 100% of second movers who chose strong reciprocity make the
same choice in the next period. As throughout the paper, all calculations are weighted
by the inverse of the number of periods played.23
From Fig. 3 one can see that all of the three main strategies are quite stable. A sec-
ond mover who chooses one of these strategies has between a 62% and a 100%
chance of choosing the same strategy in the next period. In comparison, the strategies
Specifically, they show that, if the fraction of cooperation that is due to strategically-motivated second
movers is high-enough then players play a mixed strategy that implies some first movers will defect even
after meeting a cooperating second mover. That some first movers cooperate after meeting a defecting
second mover is consistent with subjects using strategies that are more forgiving than the well-known
grim-trigger and tit-for-tat strategies. Such strategies can induce higher levels of cooperation if players are
prone to making mistakes (for further evidence see Bruttel and Kamecke 2011; Fudenberg et al. 2011).
23The reason unconditional cooperation appears in Fig. 2 but not it Fig. 3 is that a majority of the occur-
rences of this strategy happened for players that played only one period, and hence we do not have enough
observations to treat it as a separate category in Fig. 3.
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that fall within “Other” are considerably less robust: second movers are more likely
to switch than to choose one of the strategies in this group for two consecutive peri-
ods. Using binomial probability tests and the null hypothesis that the probability of
choosing the same strategy in period t and t + 1 is less than 50% (i.e., a subject is
more likely to switch than to choose the same strategy), we can reject it for reputation
building, unconditional defection, and strong reciprocity (p < 0.048). We do reject
the null for strategies under “Other” (p = 0.813).24
With respect to the motivation of second movers to switch strategies per se, besides
choosing a strategy under “Other,” we do find that neither the previously chosen strat-
egy nor the outcome in the previous period predicts whether a second mover changes
strategy or not.25
4.4 Disentangling the endgame effect
A nice feature of our experimental method is that it isolates the endgame effect into
one (the last) period, which makes studying it much easier. If subjects differ in their
ability to perform backward induction, in games with a finite number of periods,
it is difficult to know whether a subject defects in periods other than the last period
because he managed to backward-induct or due to other reasons such as reciprocating
the defection of others (Selten and Stoecker 1986; McKelvey and Palfrey 1992; Katok
et al. 2002).
As seen in Table 2, there is a pronounced endgame effect in our experiment. In
Main, the cooperation rate calculated with the subjects’ strategies is considerably
higher in continuation periods than in last periods: it drops from 48% to 15% (WSR
test, p < 0.001). Moreover, there is already an obvious difference in the first period
(WSR test, p < 0.001), which indicates that, even before they have had the opportu-
nity to interact, subjects make a clear distinction between the two situations.
Generally, endgame effects can be thought as being caused by three distinct rea-
sons. First, individuals who are willing to conditionally cooperate in the last periods
of a game switch to defection because they expect others will start to defect. Second,
individuals who cooperate solely because of the existence of future interaction—what
24An alternative to looking at the stability of specific strategies is to think there are two types of individuals:
those who are willing to cooperate in the last period (i.e., for non-strategic reasons) and those who are not.
This gives us a group of “non-strategically-motivated” strategies and a group of “strategically-motivated”
strategies. As a group, strategically motivated strategies are remarkably stable: 89% of second movers who
chose one of these strategies in period t do so again in t + 1. Non-strategically motivated strategies are
only slightly less stable: 75% of second movers who select a non-strategically motivated strategy select
one again in the next period.
25We ran a probit regression with a binary variable indicating whether a subject changes strategy from
period t to t + 1 as the dependent variable. As independent variables we use dummy variables indicating
which was the strategy chosen in t and the period number. We find that, compared to choosing uncondi-
tional defection, choosing a strategy from “Other” in period t is associated with a 38% higher probability
of choosing a different strategy in t + 1 (p = 0.009). A similar regression using dummy variables to in-
dicate the realized outcomes in t (instead of strategies) does not result in significant coefficients. We also
do not get significant coefficients for realized outcomes if we run a separate regression for unconditional
defection and reputation building (we cannot run a regression for strong reciprocity since it does not vary
or for strategies under “Other” since we have too few observations). Regressions were run using White’s
heteroskedasticity consistent estimator to cluster on second movers.
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Fig. 4 Causes of the endgame effect. Note: The leftmost bar shows the total endgame effect: the differ-
ence between the cooperation rate in continuation and last periods. The bar labeled “observed” shows the
breakdown of the actual endgame effect. To give each subject the same weight, percentages are weighted
by the inverse of the number of periods played. The rightmost bars show how the breakdown would look
like in two hypothetical cases: a case where second movers reciprocate in the last period but first movers
defect because they expect defection (bar labeled “only non-strategic cooperation”), and a case where sec-
ond movers are cooperating strategically and first movers defect because they anticipate their defection
(bar labeled “only strategic cooperation”)
we call strategic cooperation—switch to defection as the prospects of future interac-
tion disappear. Third, individuals who switch to defection because they experienced
defection due to the previous two causes and as a consequence start defecting them-
selves.
With our experimental method, we can observe the impact of each of these three
reasons. On the one hand, since second movers can condition their choice on the
choice of the first mover, their strategies are independent of their expectations of first-
mover behavior. Hence, their contribution to the endgame effect is restricted to the
second and third reasons, which we can further differentiate because we observe how
second movers condition their choices: conditioning between continuation periods
and last periods allows us to see how much cooperation drops due to strategic reasons,
and conditioning on the action of the first mover (in the last period) allows us to see
how much cooperation drops due to experienced defection. On the other hand, given
that cooperation by second movers is almost exclusively conditional (i.e., first movers
cannot reasonably expect to defect and get the temptation payoff), first movers who
switch from cooperation in continuation periods to defection in the last period should
be doing so exclusively because they expect second movers will defect more.
Figure 4 depicts the breakdown of the endgame effect in our experiment. The
leftmost bar equals the total endgame effect (a drop in the cooperation rate of 32.9
percentage points). The bar labeled “observed” shows the breakdown of the endgame
effect into the three reasons discussed above. It shows that slightly more than half
of the total endgame effect (18.6 percentage points) can be attributed to the first
movers’ anticipation of second-mover defection. About 40% of the endgame effect
(13.6 percentage points) is due to second movers who were cooperating for strategic
reasons, and less then 3% of the endgame effect (0.8 percentage points) is due to
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second movers reacting to the increase in first-mover defection.26 WSR tests indicate
that the first two reasons are significantly different from zero (p < 0.002) whereas
the third reason is not (p = 0.537). Lastly, to provide a comparison, the rightmost
bars depict how the breakdown of the endgame effect would look like in two focal
examples (keeping the size of the endgame effect constant). The bar labeled “only
non-strategic cooperation” shows the breakdown in a hypothetical world where sec-
ond movers are willing to reciprocate in the last period but first movers defect because
they (wrongly) expect second movers will defect. By contrast, the bar labeled “only
strategic cooperation” shows the breakdown in a world where second movers are
cooperating strategically and first movers defect because they (correctly) anticipate
second movers will defect. As we can see, the actual breakdown closely resembles
the case where the endgame effect is solely caused by correctly anticipated strategic
cooperation.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel experimental method that disentangles, within sub-
jects, strategic from non-strategic behavior in repeated games. We use it to distin-
guish strategic from non-strategic motivations for cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma
games. In the experiment, subjects play the strategic equivalent of an indefinitely-
repeated sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. The novelty of our method is that
choices can be conditioned on whether the period of play is the last period or not.
This allows us to identify whether a subject is using a strategically-motivated strat-
egy, which conditions behavior on whether it is the last period or not, or a non-
strategically-motivated strategy, which does not condition behavior on the endgame.
Hence, we extend the method introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fis-
chbacher and Gächter (2010) to identify not only different types of non-strategically-
motivated cooperators but also types of strategically-motivated cooperators. We vali-
date the use of our method by comparing behavior in treatments with and without the
strategy method. We show that individuals’ “hot” decisions are not different from the
decisions derived by eliciting strategies.
We find that the three most common strategies of second movers are uncondi-
tional defection, reputation building, and strong reciprocity. Not only are these the
most common strategies, our data suggests that they are also the most stable strate-
gies within subjects. If we concentrate on the strategies that account for the observed
cooperation, we find that reputation building is responsible for a majority of all coop-
erative actions whereas strong reciprocity accounts for much less of cooperative ac-
tions. These results can be seen as good news for inducing infinitely-repeated games
26This breakdown of the endgame effect is specific to the matching of first and second movers that occurred
in the experiment. One can also make the calculations using the cooperation rates in Table 2 (i.e., for any
matching). In this case, the total endgame effect is a drop of 30.1 percentage points, the contribution of
first mover beliefs is 18.6 percentage points, the contribution of strategic cooperation by second movers
is 8.9 percentage points, and the contribution due to the reaction of second movers to more first-mover
defection is 2.6 percentage points.
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in the lab by random termination since they imply that subjects understand the dif-
ference between continuation and termination periods and change their behavior ac-
cordingly. These results are in line with the idea put forth by Kreps et al. (1982)
that a small number of non-strategic cooperators can change the incentives of more
strategic individuals and induce a lot of cooperation (see Camerer and Fehr 2006).
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Additional analysis and data
A.1 Additional analysis of the strategy method
In this subsection, we test whether allowing subjects to condition their choice on
whether they are playing the last period or not affects how second movers condition
their choice on the action of the first mover. Table 3 presents the frequencies of the
four ways in which second movers can condition their choice on the action of the first
mover.
As we can see, the distributions are very similar in Main and Control I. In fact,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that choices in all treatments are derived from the
same distribution using multinomial probit regressions with treatment dummies as
independent variables and using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent estimator to
cluster on pairs of subjects (p = 0.825 in continuation periods and p = 0.335 in last
periods).
Table 3 Conditional cooperation in Main and Control I
Cont. periods Last periods
Main Control I Main Control I
Unconditional cooperation 9% 2% 5% 10%
Cooperate only if first mover cooperates 39% 50% 16% 17%
Cooperate only if first mover defects 3% 5% 1% 7%
Unconditional defection 49% 44% 78% 67%
Note: The table shows, for Main and Control I, the frequency of each of the four ways in which sec-
ond movers can condition their choice on the action of the first mover. Frequencies are shown separately
for continuation periods and last periods. To give each pair of subjects the same weight, frequencies are
weighted by the inverse of the number of periods played
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Table 4 Distribution of
strategies of second movers
Note: The table shows the
frequency of the strategies used
by second movers in Main. To
give each subject the same
weight, frequencies are
weighted by the inverse of the
number of periods played
Strategy Frequency
Continuation period Last period
First mover First mover First mover First mover
Cooperates Defects Cooperates Defects
Defect Defect Defect Defect 43.7%
Defect Defect Cooperate Defect 5.6%
Defect Defect Defect Cooperate 0.0%
Defect Defect Cooperate Cooperate 0.0%
Cooperate Defect Defect Defect 32.7%
Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect 5.6%
Cooperate Defect Defect Cooperate 0.7%
Cooperate Defect Cooperate Cooperate 0.0%
Defect Cooperate Defect Defect 1.7%
Defect Cooperate Cooperate Defect 1.1%
Defect Cooperate Defect Cooperate 0.0%
Defect Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate 0.0%
Cooperate Cooperate Defect Defect 0.0%
Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate Defect 3.3%
Cooperate Cooperate Defect Cooperate 0.7%
Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate 5.0%
A.2 Additional data of second mover strategies
Table 4 presents the complete distribution of the elicited strategies of second movers
in Main. Note that the strategies in the first, fifth, sixth, and sixteenth rows correspond
respectively to the strategies in Table 1: unconditional defection, reputation building,
strong reciprocity, and unconditional cooperation.
A.3 Additional analysis of rational reputation building
Here, we derive the condition under which rational own-payoff maximizing second
movers choose reputation building over unconditional defection. Intuitively, second
movers reputation build if the fraction of “strong reciprocators” among first movers
is sufficiently high. If this is the case, a second mover has a high-enough chance that
the last period of the game is reached without a deviation from mutual cooperation
and that the first mover then cooperates, which allows the second mover to obtain
some gains from cooperation and the temptation payoff.
To simplify, we assume that there are two types of first movers: “strong recipro-
cators” who cooperate in period t as long as the second mover cooperated in period
t − 1 and irrespective of whether the period played is the last period or not, and
“own-payoff maximizers” who do defect in the last period and strategically coop-
erate in continuation periods (if doing so is profitable). Denote α as the fraction of
strongly reciprocating first movers and 1 − α as the fraction of own-payoff maximiz-
ing first movers. A rational own-payoff maximizing second mover prefers reputation
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building instead of unconditional defection in period t = 0 if the expected payoff
from reputation building is higher than the one from unconditional defection:
απT + (1 − α)πD +
∞∑
t=1






t=1 δt = δ1−δ and solving for α, gives the condition
α ≥ π
T − πC − δ(πT − πD)
πT − πD − δ(πT − πD) .
For our choice of parameters, this condition translates to α ≥ 0.028.
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